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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff/petitioner, Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin (hereinafter 
"Viking"), has correctly stated the relevant parties to this proceeding. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Viking has cited Rule 46(a)(4), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as grounds for 
its Petition. Viking contends that the opinion by the Court of Appeals contains three errors. 
Viking further argues that these three errors encompass important issues of state law which are of 
first impression to this Court. However, a review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion demonstrates 
that the Court of Appeals did not err and, indeed, that the decision rendered in the above-cited 
case is grounded in precepts set forth earlier by this Court in National Farmers Union Property & 
Casualty Co. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.. 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978). Thus, Viking's 
Petition should be denied. (The specifics of defendants/respondents, Trans Coastal Trucking's 
(hereinafter "Trans Coastal") and Allen Coleman's (hereinafter "Coleman"), objections to the 
three issues cited by Viking is more thoroughly discussed in the Argument section of this Brief). 
THE OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
While it is correct that the Court of Appeals filed its Opinion on November 7, 
1996, reversing the trial court's Order granting Viking's Motion for Summary Judgment, Viking 
has mischaracterized the specific holding and basis of said Opinion. Trans Coastal, at the Court 
of Appeals, argued that a "causal nexus" or "causal connection" test be applied by the Court to 
determine whether or not the accident arose out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the 
vehicle. This test was based on both this Court's analysis in National Farmers Union Property & 
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Casualty Co v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.. 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978), as well as case law 
from other jurisdictions cited to the Court by Trans Coastal and Coleman. Indeed, the Opinion 
issued by the Court of Appeals in this case specifically adopts this "causal nexus" or "causal 
connection" test, requiring that the accident have a causal connection or nexus to the vehicle. 
The Court of Appeals clearly did not base its decision on the subjective intent of Coleman rather, 
it based its decision on the objective facts and circumstances of the case in light of the terms of 
the insurance contract at issue. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is appropriate under Utah Code Ann. §78-
2-2(3)(a) and (5). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Trans Coastal and Coleman specifically reject the contention made by Viking that 
this is a statutory interpretation case. Viking's Complaint requests that the trial court declare the 
rights and duties of Viking under its insurance contract and does not mention §31 A-22-303, Utah 
Code Ann. (R. 1-4). Additionally, in filing its Motion for Summary Judgment, Viking alleged 
that there was no coverage under the insurance contract for the accident, and did not ask the 
court below to interpret the statute now cited. Thus, the rules of construction for insurance 
contracts apply, and not the rules of construction for statutes. Accordingly, §31 A-22-303, Utah 
Code Ann. is not controlling or relevant to this case. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case came before the Court of Appeals on appeal of the district court's Order 
finding that the accident in question did not reasonably arise out of the operation, maintenance, or 
use of an insured vehicle under the terms of the Viking insurance contract issued to defendant 
Coleman, and as a result thereof, that Viking owed no duty to indemnify its insured, Coleman, or 
the many defendants who are all claimants. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Viking filed this action on December 20, 1994, against defendants, Coleman, Trans 
Coastal, Rene B. Peterson (hereinafter "Peterson") and Utah Department of Transportation 
(hereinafter "UDOT"). (R. 1-6). This action concerns an accident which occurred on January 7, 
1994, on State Road 201 in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 2). Viking brought this declaratory 
judgment action, seeking a determination by the court that the accident in question did not arise 
out of "the ownership, maintenance or use" of a car as stated in the terms of Viking's insurance 
contract. (R. 4). 
To this end, on May 9, 1995, plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on 
this issue. (R. 82). Subsequently, on May 22, 1995, Trans Coastal filed a Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the same issue. (R. 162). Coleman, on May 24, 1995, joined in Trans 
Coastal's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 195). On May 26, 1995, Peterson joined in 
Trans Coastal's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 198). 
On or about August 1, 1995, oral argument was held before the Honorable Homer 
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F. Wilkinson on the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. At the end of argument, the district 
court granted Viking's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Trans Coastal's, Coleman^s 
and Peterson's Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 228). Thereafter, on or about 
October 10, 1995, the court entered its Order granting Viking's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
certifying the same as final and dismissing all Counterclaims of the defendants. (R. 238). 
Trans Coastal and Coleman filed a Notice of Appeal of that decision on November 
8, 1995. (R. 246). 
On December 6, 1995, Trans Coastal and Coleman filed an Appeal Brief. The 
case was poured-over to the Court of Appeals. Viking filed its Brief in Opposition on May 8, 
1996. On June 14, 1996, Trans Coastal and Coleman filed their Reply Brief. Oral argument was 
held on September 17, 1996, before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals filed its Opinion on November 7, 1996. reversing 
the decision of the trial court and remanding the matter to the trial court. (See Appendix 1 of 
Viking's Petition for Certiorari). 
FACTS RELEVANT FOR REVIEW 
1. Coleman was a named insured under an automobile liability policy. Policy 
No. 44 00052656, issued by Viking. (R. 97). 
2. The policy was issued for a 1983 Oldsmobile Omega, VIN 
IG3AE69R7DW351369. (R. 97). 
3. The policy provides for coverage as follows: 
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We promise to pay damages, within the limits of our policy, for 
bodily injury or property damage for which the law holds you responsible 
because of a car accident involving a car we insure. 
(R. 99). 
4. "Car Accident" is defined in the policy as, "an unexpected and unintended 
event that causes bodily injury or property damage and arises out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of a car or other motor vehicle." (R. 98). 
5. On January 7, 1994, Coleman had been having mechanical trouble with his 
1983 Oidsmobile Omega automobile. (R. 123). 
6. Coleman had experienced a carburetor fire earlier that day while on his way 
to work. (R. 121). 
7. Coleman attempted to drive his vehicle from the point of the carburetor fire 
to his home in Magna, Utah, in order to effect repairs on the car. (R. 121). While on his way 
home, Coleman's vehicle broke down and ceased running. (R. 121). 
8. Coleman pulled his disabled vehicle off State Road 201. (R 121). 
9. Coleman exited his vehicle to cross the road to a gas station, to attempt to 
find a service station who would deliver auto parts. (R. 121). 
10. Coleman returned to his vehicle and waited for quite some time, but the 
delivery truck did not arrive. (R. 121). 
11. Coleman got tired of waiting and again exited his vehicle and traveled 
across the lanes of traffic, climbed the fence and used the pay telephone at the gas station to 
inquire as to when his parts would arrive. (R. 121). 
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12 On his way back to the vehicle, Coleman tripped on an uneven surface in 
the road, injuring his right knee, and could not get up, thereby causing an accident involving the 
other defendants (R 125) 
13 As to why Coleman exited his vehicle and was a pedestrian on the road in 
question on January 7, 1994, Coleman responded as follows 
Q One other question Why did you exit your vehicle on 21 st South 
on January 7th, 1994? 
MR PLANT Why did he exit his vehicle9 
MS BERRETT Yes 
MR C ARR You mean after the breakdown9 
Q. (By Ms Berrett) Was that the only reason9 Was there more than 
one reason that you exited the vehicle on January 7, 19949 
A My car broke down I had to get - I had to fix the vehicle or call a 
wrecker 




14 As a result of Coleman's fall in the center of the eastbound lane, in front of 
on-coming traffic, Peterson, who was driving the Trans Coastal tractor-trailer, swerved to avoid 
hitting Coleman, causing the tractor-trailer to roll over (R 128) 
15 Due to the rollover, Peterson sustained personal injuries, the Trans Coastal 
tractor-trailer was damaged beyond repair, and UDOT property was damaged (R 1-6, 45-53, 
and 222-227) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 31A-22-303(l) IS 
NOT AT ISSUE, THEREFORE, THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS 
CORRECT NOT TO ADDRESS THE STATUTE. 
The Court of Appeals did not address §31A-22-303, Utah Code Ann because it 
was not raised below, nor is it relevant to the issues presented on appeal Viking, in its Complaint 
for Declaratory Relief, requested that the trial court declare its rights and duties under its 
automobile insurance contract issued to Coleman Nowhere in the Complaint did Viking request 
a statutory interpretation of §31A-22-303 (R 1-4) Additionally, in Viking's original 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, while Viking cites §31A-22-
303(1), three times as "cf " or "see also," nowhere in the Memorandum does it request that the 
trial court render an interpretation of that statute, or put the statute at issue Additionalh. in 
Viking's Memorandum in Reply to its Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
Defendant Trans Coastal's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Viking makes no mention 
whatsoever of the statute Thus, the interpretation of §31 A-22-303 was not made an issue by 
Viking in the court below 
Moreover, it is clear that this is a case which involves the interpretation of an 
insurance contract's terms when applied to a specific accident Thus, the rules of constniction for 
insurance contracts should be employed, and not the rules pertinent to statutory construction 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the appropriate rules of construction 
applicable to insurance contracts which have been so clearly stated in decisions by this Court In 
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construing the rights and duties of the parties under an insurance contract, this Court has 
declared 
Since 1921 this Court has expressed its commitment to the principle that 
"insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and 
their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of 
insurance " 
U S Fidelity & Guar Co. v Sandt. 854 P 2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993)(other citations omitted) 
Indeed, "insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the 
insured because they are adhesion contracts drafted by the insurance companies " Id At 522 
(citing, DiEnes v Safeco Life Ins. Co . 442 P 2d 468, 471 (Utah 1968)). Finally, this Court has 
historically admonished that "the insured is entitled to the broadest protection that he could 
reasonably believe the commonly understood meaning of its terms afforded him." M (citing, 
P E Ashton Co. v. Jovner. 406 P 2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965)(emphasis added)) 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in its decision by failing to address 
§31A-22-303, Utah Code Ann Additionally, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the 
foregoing rules of construction to the insurance contract at issue, finding that the Viking policy 
should provide the broadest coverage reasonably understood from the terms used in said contract. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED A "CAUSAL NEXUS" TEST IN 
THIS CASE AND DID NOT APPLY A "BUT FOR" TEST. 
Viking urges that the Court of Appeals' Opinion is flawed because the court 
applied a "but for" test, rather than a "causal nexus" test to determine whether or not there was 
coverage for the accident at issue The Court of Appeals correctly found that a "causal nexus," or 
"causally connected," or "integrally related" test was the appropriate test to apply to determine 
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whether or not the accident was sufficiently related to the ownership, maintenance, and use of the 
insured vehicle to trigger coverage Viking contends that the Court of Appeals ignored its own 
holding and used a "but for" analysis based on one statement found in the Opinion at page 7, i e , 
"[t]hus, had Coleman's vehicle not stopped running, Coleman would not have crossed the 
freeway to arrange to repair his car " (See, Opinion at 7, Add 1, to Viking's Petition) 
Viking's assertion ignores the express holding of the Court of Appeals, as well as 
its very thorough analysis, and focuses only on the one sentence quoted above A careful review 
of the entire Opinion demonstrates that the Court of Appeals acknowledged that in applying the 
"causal nexus" test, the determination as to whether or not there is such a nexus between the 
accident and the ownership, maintenance, or use of the vehicle is a fact intensive examination 
(See, Opinion at 6) The Court of Appeals then reviewed the relevant facts and determined that 
"Coleman was continually in the process of trying to repair his vehicle from the moment he pulled 
off the roadside until said accident" Indeed, the Court of Appeals expressly found that the 
intervening events, "crossing the roadway, contacting the auto repair store, returning to his car to 
await the part delivery, and retracing his steps across the roadway to inquire about the part 
delivery — were 'integrally related' to Coleman's 'ownership, maintenance, or use' of the 
vehicle " (See, Opinion at 7) 
Additionally, while the Court of Appeals acknowledged the similarity between the 
facts in Eichelberger v. Warner. 434 A 2d 747 (Pa Super 1995), and the facts in the instant case, 
the Court used more than the "but for" analysis employed in Eichelberger. and stated that the 
proximity of the accident to the vehicle is "fconly one factor to be weighed as part of the totality of 
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the circumstances present in the case '" (See, Opinion at 7, citing, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co v 
McMichael. 906 P 2d 92, 103 (Colo 1995) 
Moreover, the numerous cases from other jurisdictions that are extensively 
discussed in both Trans Coastal's and Coleman's Brief in support of their appeal and their Reply 
Brief, uphold the analysis employed by the Court of Appeals, as does this Court's analysis of the 
language, "arising out of," as used in another context in National Farmers Union Casualty Co V 
Western Casualty & Surety Co , 577 P d 961 (Utah 1978) Accordingly, there was a sufficient 
causal nexus between the accident and Coleman's ownership, maintenance, and use of the vehicle. 
Thus, this Petition should be denied and the Court of Appeals' Opinion should stand 
in . THE COURT OF APPEALS DEO NOT BASE THEIR FINDING OF 
COVERAGE ON THE BASIS OF THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT OF THE 
INSURED. 
There is nothing in the Court of Appeals' Opinion which would lead an>one to -
believe that the Court of Appeals has established a subjective intent test to determine whether or 
not there is a causal nexus between an accident and the ownership, maintenance, and use of a 
vehicle The Court of Appeals, in its decision, found a causal connection or nexus between the 
actions of the insured which lead to the accident, and the ownership, maintenance and use of the 
vehicle Likewise, Viking's assertion that the Opinion is so broad that it would eviserate the risks 
for which automobile liability insurance exists is equally unsupportable The Opinion states that 
whether or not an accident is causally connected or had a nexus to ownership, maintenance, and 
use of the vehicle, is a fact intensive analysis The Court looked at the objective facts presented in 
this case Only one of the factors is the proximity of the insured to the vehicle at the time of the 
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accident. Viking would have this Court determine nexus based upon strictly the physical 
proximity of the insured to the vehicle at the time of the accident. The language of the policy 
does not, however, limit coverage to proximity. Should Viking wish to limit coverage for an 
accident occurring within five to ten feet of the insured vehicle in connnection with the ownership, 
maintenance, and use of the vehicle, Viking, who authored the insurance contract, could put such 
a restriction in the policy. Viking did not choose to limit coverage in that way. Accordingly, 
there is coverage for the accident, and the Court of Appeals' decision, should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Viking's attempts to find error in the Court of Appeals Opinion are disingenuous. 
Viking makes issues where none exist, or misconstrues the pure language of the Opinion to 
attempt to create ambiguity. This is not a case of statutory interpretation, rather, this is a fact 
intensive analysis of the causal connection or nexus between an accident and the ownership, 
maintenance, and use of a vehicle and the interpretation of those terms as used in the insurance 
contract at issue. Under the rules of construction for insurance contracts, the language must be 
construed in favor of the insured to provide the broadest coverage available, which the terms 
could be reasonably interpreted to afford. Additionally, in the instant case the facts were properly 
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construed in favor of Trans Coastal and Coleman Thus, the Court of Appeals' Opinion should 
stand, and Viking's Writ for Certenori should be denied 
DATED this 6th day of January, 1997 
WEISS BERRETT LOYD PETTY, L C 
BARBARAK BERRETT 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
Trans Coastal Trucking 
DATED this 6th day of January, 1997.
 A / ^ / " r 
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Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
Allen Coleman 
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